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CHAPTER 8
Hope, Hate and Indignation: Spinoza 
and Political Emotion in the Trump Era
Ericka Tucker
INTRODUCTION
Americans are angry. After an economic collapse, slow recovery, and the 
resulting increase in inequality between economic classes, those in the 
dwindling middle classes are angry. The anger of many of these people has 
been channeled by sources like Fox News and right-wing radio, internet 
sites and social media into hatred of and resentment toward immigrants, 
refugees, Muslims, and African-Americans. Throughout the Obama presi-
dency Donald Trump amplified some of the most fact-challenged of these 
propaganda organizations. As a “birther”, Trump championed the idea 
that Barack Obama was a Muslim born in Kenya after all evidence pointed 
to the contrary. This theory, however, served as an organizing tool for 
those who believed their country had been “taken over” by those who did 
not look like them and who they believed threatened their way of life. The 
resentment and anger, for which it was a lightning rod, was a potent politi-
cal force in the 2016 election. This resentment and anger brought Donald 
Trump into the White House.1
Although the circumstances of the U.S. Election in 2016 are far from 
the 17th Century world of philosopher Spinoza, his views on the role of 
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emotions in human behavior and their results for political philosophy are, 
I propose, relevant insofar as hope, fear, and anger are still being employed 
as tactics to create political agreement, and insofar as there remain humans 
with the capacity to feel anger, fear, and even hope.
While less well known than Hobbes or Machiavelli, Spinoza offered a 
new set of arguments for why political leaders should take into consider-
ation the emotions of the populace, and indeed, to build policy and insti-
tutions to shape these emotions for the good of the state. Spinoza’s views 
are often at odds with these better-known theorists. A key difference is 
Spinoza’s insistence that fear and hatred are emotions that diminish both 
the power of individual humans and the states of which they are part.2 
Following from this, Spinoza proposes that the state gains its power from 
that of its citizens, and thus, should try to organize it’s policies and institu-
tions to empower its citizens either through emotions like ‘joy’ or through 
more active participation in and knowledge of the activities of the state. 
Before we take Spinoza to be too naive a philosopher to take politics seri-
ously, he also worried about the role of hope in individual lives and in poli-
tics. Hope, he argued, was a variety of fear, and as such made individuals 
in its grip less powerful than they might otherwise be.
In this chapter, I will set out the ideas of Spinoza on the political emotions 
while using the extended example of Donald Trump’s campaign and early 
presidency. While all presidential elections arouse strong emotions, the Trump 
campaign and early presidency have seemed to arouse two kinds of emotions 
that Spinoza thought to be quite dangerous for the state, and enervating for 
both those who experienced them and the state of which they were a part: 
hatred and indignation. Before delving into these, I’ll begin with an emotion 
that one might think would be good, namely, hope to see it as Spinoza might 
have: an emotion which, once disappointed, can turn into hate.
TRUMP’S EMOTIONAL POLITICS
On the surface, one could hardly imagine two more different presidential 
campaigns than that of Barack Obama in 2008 and Donald Trump in 
2016. Obama’s campaign was built on the idea of grassroots community 
organizing, and explicitly campaigned on the idea of hope—that the future 
could be better than the past and the present.3 Hope was a keyword in his 
2004 keynote address to the Democratic National Convention.4 Obama’s 
book, The Audacity of Hope, set out a program of creating a better future 
and realizing the hope of inclusion through increasing public participation 
in democracy and in civic engagement.5
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Barack Obama appealed to the hope for better times in 2008—a 
moment of widespread fear after a major international economic collapse. 
Obama offered the nation a hopeful vision of the future. He was also a 
candidate seemingly without a history. He had not been a politician for 
long before his inspiring speech at the 2004 Democratic National 
Convention. In 2016, after eight years of an obstructionist congress, a less 
progressive president than many were hoping for and the expansion of 
right-wing propaganda into mainstream media, Americans were angry.6 
Hope had turned to anger.
Trump’s appeal to that anger was highly emotive, and ultimately suc-
cessful. Trump’s campaign was characterized by many as focused on fear- 
mongering and hate.7 Trump insisted that the United States was under 
siege, and that threats to Americans were coming from both the outside 
and within from Muslim terrorists to Mexican immigrants.8 His solutions 
were in the broadest sense ‘protective’ and ‘exclusionary’.9 To prevent 
these threats, Trump argued, we must ban Muslims from entering the 
country, restrict immigration in general, and build a border wall between 
the United States and Mexico.10 Trump’s campaign, while promising to 
“Make America Great Again” was more critical of the contemporary state 
of the United States, arguing that America needed to be “taken back”.11 
In a campaign rally in Wisconsin, Trump argued, “This is your last chance 
… to take back power from all the people who’ve taken it from you over 
so many years.”12 The rhetoric of taking back our country could be an 
innocuous campaign promise. The parties that the country has to be taken 
back from are not identified so that those who hear it can read into it 
whatever they like. However, some argue that the phrases “take America 
back” or referring to the country as “under siege” are so-called ‘dog whis-
tles’. Dog whistles are seemingly innocuous phrases that are associated 
with white nationalist organizations and support for racist policies that are 
socially unacceptable to back openly.13 Hate groups have taken Trump’s 
policies and statements as veiled endorsements of their activities.14 Some 
argue that Trump’s rhetoric has emboldened racists, and indeed hate 
crimes in the United States are rising.15 At the same time, Trump has cut 
funding to the groups that monitor hate groups and attempt to ameliorate 
their influence.16 After the events of August 12, 2017 in Charlottesville, 
Virginia, the connection between Trump and white-supremacist move-
ment took a more direct turn, when he was slow in condemning hate 
groups initially, and then after a few days, appeared to offer support to the 
white nationalist cause.17 As I write this in August 2017, these events are 
still developing. For the purposes of this study, I am interested in the fact 
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that hate, fear and indignation played a role in making Mr. Trump’s 
campaign for President of the United States in 2016 successful.
Political psychologist Drew Westen has argued that Democrats are less 
successful at gauging and responding to affective politics—issues that 
arouse strong emotional states in citizens. In Westen’s view, Democrats 
are not as savvy as Republicans at understanding the emotions of the elec-
torate. Democratic candidates often take rational and measured stances on 
issues that are emotionally charged. While this rational or unemotional 
approach is lauded by other Democrats, Westen argues that this approach 
is ineffective among many. Westen proposes that this approach makes 
Democratic candidates appear untrustworthy and as individuals who do 
not understand the importance of an issue.18 When a candidate seems to 
have the wrong emotional response, or no emotional response to impor-
tant issues, those who are not already supporters tend to find such a can-
didate unappealing.19 Many scholars of politics have argued that a large 
swath of the American public feels resentment toward minorities, angry 
and disconnected from American public and political life,20 and disem-
powered in a globalizing economy. Given this, Trump’s appeal to and 
cultivation of the anger of the multitude who voted for him is not just 
unsurprising, but indeed, brilliant strategically.
Trump was able to recognize, and then to gain the trust of those who, like 
him, felt angry and resentful about perceived changes in the United States. 
While some of these are economic, many have to do with cultural phenomena 
that have seemingly little to do with general wellbeing. Many Trump voters, 
while genuinely afraid of Islam and immigration, noted their anger at “politi-
cal correctness” as a reason for their vote.21 Trump tapped into this anger. He 
acknowledged and amplified this anger. With every racial slur, with every rude 
comment toward women, Trump gained the trust of those who wanted 
someone to “tell it like it is”. Despite his much-documented untruth, Trump 
was seen by his supporters as honest for this reason: he was willing to say out 
loud their own hatred in a way they no longer felt comfortable doing.22 
Recognition is an incredibly powerful force.23 Trump’s acknowledgement of 
this anger, resentment, and petty emotions of a large group of people won 
him the election in 2016. Winning elections, however, is different than gov-
erning, and this may be where the efficacy of appealing to and cultivating hate 
diminishes. In the next section, I will examine Spinoza’s view of the relative 
efficacy of hope and hate as emotions to use for governing. This will take us 
first through Spinoza’s theory of the emotions, and his view of how the emo-
tions of individuals affect the political communities of which they are parts.
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SPINOZA AND EMOTIONS
In Book Three of the Ethics, Spinoza begins setting out his theory of 
emotions. First, he proposes that there are three basic emotions: pain, 
pleasure and desire.24 Now, desire turns out to be a bit more than an emo-
tion, but for our purposes, the first two are the most important. Pain and 
pleasure are the basic emotions from which all other emotions derive. All 
of what we might call the ‘positive’ emotions are pleasure modified by the 
idea of an object, a temporal dimension, a modal dimension and a proxim-
ity dimension. This sounds complicated, but is as simple as the following: 
our joy for seeing our family (object) might be increased given its nearness 
to us in time, the degree of likeliness of this visit, and whether or not there 
are likely circumstances that could block this visit, etc. Love, for Spinoza, 
is the feeling of pleasure with the idea of an object, often a person, as the 
cause. This may sound bloodless to many, but it’s really just an attempt to 
come up with a theory of how emotions can be based on relatively few 
basic emotions.25 Spinoza defines hope as “inconstant pleasure arising 
from the idea of a thing future or past, of whose outcome we are in some 
doubt.”26 When we become more certain about the outcome of some 
event, our hope becomes joy should it go our way,27 and disappointment 
should we have been wrong.28 All of the positive emotions are based on 
pleasure relating to our idea of some object, be it an individual or event. 
Our ideas about that individual or event modify our degree of pleasure, 
and some of these modifications are significant enough to merit their own 
names as specific emotions. Among the positive emotions Spinoza identi-
fies are honor, pride, esteem, joy, approbation, inclination and love.
What we might call negative emotions are all those emotions based on 
pain, but with the same sort of modifications as the positive emotions. 
Hate, for example, is defined as “pain accompanied by the idea of an exter-
nal cause.”29 Fear is defined as “inconstant pain arising from the idea of a 
thing future or past of whose outcome we are in some doubt.”30 Careful 
readers will notice the parallel between hope and fear—each is an emotion 
involving inconstancy and uncertain outcomes. Hope, for Spinoza, is thus, 
is always intermixed with fear and thus, is a negative emotion.31 Our ideas 
about the object that we believe cause us pain can increase that pain or 
diminish that pain. Should we consider something that we hate to be 
unfree, for example, Spinoza argues that our hatred will ebb.32 Our emo-
tions build on one another and our ideas about their objects. Should we 
fear something, we will hate it.33 Should we hate something, we will try to 
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destroy it.34 Spinoza defines anger as the desire to destroy that which we 
hate.35 The negative emotions that Spinoza defines include: fear, anger, 
hatred, aversion, disappointment and indignation.
Thus far, I have been using the terms ‘positive” and “negative” emotion 
without explaining the significance of this distinction. For Spinoza, all 
emotions based on pleasure, insofar as they are not intermixed with emo-
tions based on pain, express an increase in our power of acting and think-
ing.36 They are, in a straightforward sense, good for us. All emotions based 
on pain, diminish our power acting and thinking, and are always bad for 
us.37 It’s possible, for Spinoza, for us to increase our power further, through 
understanding the causes of our pain and pleasure. This understanding is 
the best way to increase our power of acting and thinking; however, emo-
tions based on joy help us to achieve this increased power as well.38
For Spinoza, the human individual seeks to free itself from pain.39 This 
means that, for example, when we’re confronted with something that 
diminishes our power, something that causes us pain, we try to imagine 
that thing destroyed or even act to destroy it in order to regain our sense 
of wellbeing or power.40 In this sense, for Spinoza, pain and other emo-
tions that are species of pain doubly enervate individual power—they 
diminish an individual’s power in the first place, and then require that that 
individual focus on their negative emotions to destroy the object which 
they believe causes the pain. This is why, for Spinoza, an affect like hatred 
can never be good.41 While pain may have its place in an affective econ-
omy, hatred can never be good. Further, Spinoza insists, the emotions of 
hope and fear in themselves can never be good.42
For Spinoza, emotions like hatred, anger, fear and even hope diminish 
humans’ power of thinking and acting, leading us to make worse deci-
sions, have less reasonable ideas than if we had emotions based on pleasure 
such as joy or love. Further, Spinoza insists, when our power is dimin-
ished, and when we experience the emotions of fear and anger, we tend to 
be at odds with one another.43
The objects of our love or hate, and our ideas about them can be 
incredibly complex. We can, Spinoza insists, hate love or fear just about 
anything,44 depending on our ideas of that thing. Our ideas are often 
wrong, so we often hate things we should love, etc., and more to the point 
we often misidentify the causes of our emotions.45 Our ideas about the 
world are shaped by those around us, and indeed, according to Spinoza 
we tend to emulate the emotions of those we identify with and whom we 
love.46 Again, for Spinoza, just because we take something to be like us we 
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may take on their emotions and ideas as our own, but whom we take to be 
like us and why is an incredibly complex process. Although, for Spinoza, 
all other humans are like us and are beneficial for us,47 he recognizes that 
we rarely recognize this, and come to love and hate other human beings 
based on a variety of contingent features48 about them which may not 
relate to us in the ways that we think and which inspire our love or hate. 
Throughout Book 3 of the Ethics, Spinoza sets out how it is that our 
affects and ideas shape one another, and are shaped by what we believe 
others to think and to feel.49 Negotiating our own affects through this 
process of socialization is one that can lead to error, but which also creates 
social groups whose likes and dislikes, emotions and ideas are shared. Even 
if the ideas and emotions of others are confused, being in a group, for 
Spinoza, is always better than being alone.50 Being in a group and sharing 
the emotions of a group does not always mean we agree on everything. 
Indeed, as Spinoza argues, we can be wrong about what others think and 
feel about anything, and we can be wrong about what they think of us. His 
example of this is somewhat appropriate: “It can easily happen that a vain 
man may be proud and imagine that he is popular with everybody, when 
in fact he is obnoxious.”51
In the next section, I will set out how Spinoza’s thought about the 
emotions—particularly of hope, fear and indignation—work when he con-
siders humans living together in political communities.
It is not that important who sits in the White House if the structures of democ-
racy are strong. If the structures of democracy are strong—you can have a mad-
man or madwoman for four years or even eight, and then he or she is gone, and 
the nation’s freedoms live.52
EMOTIONS AND INSTITUTIONS: SPINOZA’S POLITICAL 
THOUGHT
Spinoza based his political philosophy on his theory of emotions53 developed 
in the Ethics. We have seen above that, for Spinoza, emotions like hate and 
fear diminish the power of individual humans, and in the political works, he 
argues that although fear may be useful at times, it should be avoided given 
that an individual or populace overcome by fear is weak. However, while 
Spinoza’s sage-like figure in the Ethics sought individual perfection and rea-
son, Spinoza did not seek perfection in the political realm. Spinoza is clear 
at the very beginning of his Political Treatise, that those who would seek to 
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perfect human nature in either governance or citizenship were dreaming of 
a ‘golden age’ that never existed.54 We cannot rely on a leader or citizen’s 
virtue for the freedom or stability of a state, we need institutions that shape 
the emotions, ideas and actions of humans so that they can live together. In 
the political realm, hope and fear are the major engines of affective organiza-
tion of the multitude. While both are dangerous for individuals, given that 
reason cannot be expected in large numbers, Spinoza agrees with Hobbes 
and Machiavelli that they have political utility. Spinoza insists that the best 
leader ought to govern with kindness, with limited appeals to hope and fear, 
and other passive affects like hatred. In the following section I will set out 
his views of how these emotions.
Hope, according to Spinoza, is a dangerous emotion for individuals. 
However, given the choice between hope and fear as tools of governance, 
Spinoza leaves open room for the use of hope. Hope, in political life, is a 
better tool for a government to use to coordinate its populace, because it 
is a species of pleasure. For individuals, it is contraindicated because of 
the measure of fear intermixed with this pleasure; however, pleasure beats 
pain in Spinoza’s calculations of the power of human emotions. Pleasure 
increases human power, while pain or fear diminishes it.55 Thus, even a 
pleasure intermixed with fear is better than fear alone. Like a fearful indi-
vidual, a fearful population is dangerous and weak.56 Their weakness, 
however, does not give the state more power, but rather, gives the state 
an inordinate number of potential individuals to worry about while 
diminishing its overall power.
The weakest form of state for Spinoza is one where there are very few 
who govern and a large population that is governed but has no say in 
either advising or in making decisions in the commonwealth. This is how 
Spinoza understands monarchy. Monarchy, traditionally, is the rule of the 
one, but Spinoza argues that each monarchy is really a hidden aristocracy, 
since the monarch is only a single human individual, and needs help to 
govern. Monarchies on Spinoza’s view, have characteristic problems, 
namely, they exclude the multitude of citizen-subjects from rule, and thus 
must create ways in which to either include these individuals in govern-
ment (which is what Spinoza suggests), but more often tend to try to find 
ways to diminish the power of this multitude, so that the monarch need 
worry less about the development of powerful individuals, factions, or 
even general revolt.57 Diminishing the power of one’s people, however, 
diminishes the power of the state. If the state weakens the multitude, this 
same multitude will be too weak to act collectively or to carry out state 
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policies. Should the state need to, for example, counter foreign invasion, 
raise capital for infrastructure, or prepare for and recover from natural 
disasters, the multitude of individuals whose power has been diminished 
to make them innocuous, also makes them too weak and disorganized to 
act together as successfully as they might otherwise have done. Weakening 
one’s own population may allow one (or a few) to rule without worry, 
but they cannot govern effectively or hope for any large-scale collective 
action or collaboration. This is one way in which to work out how fear 
weakens the state according to Spinoza’s view. Fear diminishes the poten-
tial power of a state, which is held in the persons which make it up and 
their manner of organization. By making citizen subjects fearful and sus-
picious of one another—a natural outgrowth of fear—the collective 
power of the state is weakened.58
Disappointed hope leads to fear, hatred and indignation.59 This indig-
nation can lead to what we might call ‘nihilism’, but what Spinoza char-
acterized as having “nothing to hope or fear from the state”.60 Those 
who believe that they have nothing to hope or fear from the state may 
not be correct—they may gain all sorts of advantages from the state or 
they may indeed have much to lose if the state were to act against them—
however, our beliefs are not determined by what is the case. The feeling 
of indignation, for Spinoza, combined with the belief that one has noth-
ing to hope or fear from the state, creates a citizenry that poses the most 
serious danger.61 A ruler who evokes the indignation of the majority puts 
the very existence of the state in jeopardy. While fear and hate diminish 
the power of the individuals in a state and the state itself, indignation 
threatens the very status of a state.
While Spinoza is ambivalent about the usefulness of hope, he is 
unequivocal about the destructive power of hate and anger. Hate, for 
Spinoza, is always bad. Thus, if a political figure seeks to appeal to anger, 
this is always a bad or destructive action. That’s not to say it wouldn’t be 
successful—in the short term. Indeed, hatred of something can be 
shared. The object of shared hatred can briefly unify a group, and their 
shared power can be used to destroy the object of their hatred. However, 
hatred is not a force that unifies for long. Spinoza recognizes that anger 
against a common enemy can, briefly, be a source of political unity.62 
However, he argues it is not a good basis for collective association.63 As 
hate is a species of pain, it weakens individuals, and thus, weakens the 
groups of which they are part.
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According to Sharp, Spinoza insists that, “Peace, or political unity, 
depends upon organizing our social relations to counter one of the most 
prevalent emotions among human beings: odium”64 Odium, or hatred, as 
an individual emotion enervates an individual’s power to think and act, 
and as a collective emotion, or as a way of organizing a group, makes the 
group weaker than they would otherwise be. Recently, philosopher Myisha 
Cherry has argued that anger can be good. Cherry argues that a species of 
anger, which she calls “moral anger” is an important motivator to political 
action and as a proper response to, for example, injustice.65 Another source 
of arguments in favor of anger as ‘good’ or at least ‘proper’ can be found 
or derived from the literature in ethics on the fittingness of emotions.66 
Feminist philosopher Marilyn Frye has argued that anger, particularly 
women’s anger, has been repressed, and that to free repressed anger is 
genuinely liberatory.67 For Spinoza, no passive emotion like hatred can 
ever be liberatory. However, understanding ones emotions and their 
causes can be. Indeed, for Spinoza, knowing ourselves as part of the natu-
ral world, with emotions that are caused often by external forces that are 
also natural, is the only real way in which people become free and how we 
overcome hatred—but that is another matter.68 Reason, like perfection, is 
not a requirement of political participation for Spinoza.
If we cannot expect reason in either our leaders or our citizenry, how 
can we expect to have a stable state? Spinoza does not think that we can 
make people live wisely, but we can “guide” them to feelings that conduce 
to the greater good of the commonwealth by laying a good foundation for 
the state.69 States derive their power from the individuals that make them 
up and the way they are coordinated or how they agree. Widespread indig-
nation is a sign, for Spinoza, that governments have failed to do so. For 
some scholars, Spinoza’s notion of indignation is akin to a concept of 
resistance. It is the point at which human power can take down the state. 
Indignation may be a cousin of Cherry’s notion of moral anger. Filippo 
Del Lucchese proposes that the notion of indignation indicates that 
Spinoza believed that people sought an incorruptible state.70 Thus, when 
something appears to shake the foundations of a state, the people become 
indignant. Indignation is the limit of the power of the state.71 For Spinoza, 
human power always makes up the power of the state.72 For Spinoza, the 
state has no juridical limit to its power. More extreme even than Hobbes’ 
view: for Spinoza the state is in the state of nature. Nothing limits its right 
other than its power.73 The only limit to the power of the state is the 
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indignation of the people. The power of the state is limited by what the 
people will allow. Their indignation is resistance to the state. Spinoza 
derives from this a prescription to any state leader or functionary: if one 
wishes a state to persist, one must avoid creating the kinds of laws that will 
cause the people indignation, and avoid the kind of behavior that will rile 
up the multitude against the state.74 These are two separate suggestions, 
based on the idea that the indignation of the people is a (and perhaps the 
only) limit on the state’s use of power. When the hatred of the populace is 
focused on the state or the rulers of the government, this is certainly one 
way in which the state can topple, but this is hardly a good result for 
Spinoza. Spinoza sought ways to create strong political institutions;75 he 
did not hope for their destruction. The essential insight of these thinkers, 
and the work of Alexandre Matheron on which they are based, is the idea 
that, for Spinoza, the limit of the power of the state is the power of the 
multitude.76 The limit of this power is what the multitude of individuals 
will agree to, and their collective indignation marks the limit of that to 
which they will agree. Like the quotation above from Wolf et  al, for 
Spinoza, strong democratic institutions can withstand a bad leader or 
vicious citizens. If a state cannot rein in a bad leader, then its institutions 
have failed.77
The state, and its leaders, can act only insofar as the people allow. That 
is, when the people become indignant—angry at the leaders of the state—
the power of the state and its leaders are diminished. Spinoza sets out 
some prudential advice for leaders of a state, based on his undemanding of 
human emotions and how the most destructive of these emotions are 
aroused. For Spinoza, indignation is caused by the widespread perception 
that the leaders are acting in any one of the following ways:
• Acting viciously: that is, the leader is or has been found to indulge in 
vices, illegal acts, corruption, or other acts that are widely 
condemned.78
• Violating the norms of the state. Even when the leader is not engag-
ing in illegal or vicious acts, they may violate the political, social or 
even basic comportment norms of the state. The most serious of 
these is when a leader violates the basic principles or fundamental 
laws of a state.79
• Removing basic freedoms. When a ruler attempts to rescind a free-
dom or a right that is basic to the citizens.80
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Any leader who does the above, or who is thought to have done the 
above is in danger of arousing the indignation of the multitude of citizens, 
thereby losing power and undermining the power of the state.
TRUMP: FROM HATE TO INDIGNATION
Indignation, the anger of the multitude toward the rulers and institutions 
of government, is a perilous situation for any state.81 As I write this, the 
approval ratings for Trump are 38 per cent.82 The disapproval rate is 54.7 
per cent.83 Hate groups are emboldened, the leader of North Korea 
believes that the President of the United States has declared war,84 and 
Trump has called for the firing of dozens of players in the National Football 
League.85 Between the hatred and anger candidate Trump used and culti-
vated to get elected and the anger and indignation mounting against 
Trump as President, these are dangerous times for the United States. Do 
we have Spinozist reasons to worry about Trump? In a word: yes.
Trump’s campaign and his early presidency have made extensive use of 
fear and hatred. For Spinoza, to the extent a leader uses fear and hatred, 
he weakens the civil state. This can be elaborated in a number of ways: 
with hate crimes on the rise, we have more violence and to an extent social 
peace and trust are eroded. Angrier citizens are weaker citizens. Weaker 
citizens lead to a weaker state, on Spinoza’s view. Perhaps more worrying 
is that Trump’s actions have fulfilled the criteria listed above for the kinds 
of things that tend to arouse the indignation of the people. Trump’s flout-
ing of norms of presidential comportment through texting national policy 
decisions, false assertions, calling for the firing of private citizens, name 
calling, nepotism, failing to release his taxes, and failing to strongly 
 disconnect his personal financial dealings from policy have all put Trump 
in Spinoza’s danger zone for arousing indignation.
Now, some may say, we certainly have had presidents who have done 
similarly outrageous things; however, the proposal here is just that these are 
norms that have been flouted. For Spinoza, social norms shape our atti-
tudes.86 To be part of a society is to, generally speaking, accept and expect 
that the norms of one’s community are followed. Thus, when any norm is 
flouted any and all members of the community generally notice this, and 
excluding previous commitments, will generally condemn the flouting of a 
community norm. Some with the previous commitment to support the 
norm-flouter, might be happy about the flouting of a norm. We see this 
with Trump supporters who argue that his use of Twitter for calling out 
private citizens shows that he will not take an insult lying down, etc.
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Another set of worries for Spinoza is the leader who tries to undermine 
or significantly change the political institutions of the civil state. In this, I 
think Trump may be in a worrying position with respect at least to the right 
to vote and the right to the privacy. This is a norm against which states have 
fought back, when the Trump administration requested sensitive voter 
information.87 For others, the Trump administration’s continuing attack 
on immigrants and attempts to exclude immigrants and visitors to the 
United States based on their religion has undermined crucial features of the 
U.S. Constitution—what Spinoza would understand as the fundamental 
laws of the state. Indeed, as of the writing of this, each version of the 
Trump administration’s rules restricting immigration and entry into the 
U.S. based on religion have been rejected as unconstitutional.88 This shows 
that there is widespread recognition that many of the policies and strategies 
of the Trump administration conflict with basic ideals, norms and values. 
These conflicts have led to people disregarding (or overturning) these poli-
cies. This, for Spinoza, is the foundation of indignation, and the signs that 
the power of the state and its rulers is diminishing.
FROM INDIGNATION TO RATIONAL HOPE
Where do we go from hate and indignation? Does Spinoza provide a 
solution to states that are mired in indignation, anger and hate? The 
short answer is yes. Indeed, Spinoza’s turn to politics was inspired by the 
dark days leading up to the murder of the architects of the United 
Province’s Golden Age.
In the mid-1660s, Spinoza set aside working on his book the Ethics, to 
try and write a book about politics. He wrote to his friends and colleagues 
that he felt he needed to intervene into the debates of his own time, which 
he felt were becoming dangerously violent.89 What emerged from this was 
the Theological-Political Treatise. In this work, Spinoza seeks to argue that 
freedom to philosophize should be allowed both for the stability of the 
state and for the safety of religion. In this, he was arguing against the grain 
of his own time. The United Provinces was in the middle of a constitu-
tional crisis, and many in the United Provinces worried that the unfettered 
investigation into the natural world might challenge religious, political 
and social norms.90 Spinoza worried that Calvinist ministers were engag-
ing in politics from the pulpit, fomenting anti-scientific and anti-Republi-
can sentiments. His fears were warranted. In 1672 the Republican leaders 
of Amsterdam were killed and mutilated in the streets of The Hague, just 
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blocks from Spinoza’s home.91 With this ultimate act of barbarism, as 
Spinoza saw it, he finished the Ethics and turned to write the Political 
Treatise, in which he offers a chastened view of politics, but one which the 
central aim of all political institutions is to understand and coordinate the 
emotions of the multitude of passionate individuals who could either form 
a destructive mob or a flourishing state.92
For Spinoza, the only solution to a state organized or disorganized 
through fear and indignation is a turn toward democracy. For Spinoza, 
this meant massive democratic councils, where individuals could build col-
lective agreement without having to trust that anyone else was looking out 
for their interests. Fear undermines social trust.93 For Spinoza, rebuilding 
social trust requires institutions that do not require much trust in the 
political system or in representatives of the whole. For Spinoza, even advi-
sory councils—non-decision-making bodies—could be effective in creat-
ing the kind of political consensus that would be strong enough to build 
trust in the state.94 Spinoza argued that these councils should be large—
massive really—large enough that they could involve the participation of 
as many citizens as possible.95 He believed that this active participation of 
regular, not necessarily virtuous citizens was the best way of recreating a 
stable political culture and a strong state.96
It’s important here to note that while Spinoza argued in favor of large 
deliberative councils, he did not believe that those participating were nec-
essarily rational or virtuous. He believed that any agreement made by such 
a large group of imperfect individuals would be better than anything any 
particular one of them could devise. Such an agreement would be better, 
Spinoza thought, both on its individual merits and because the delibera-
tive process created stakeholders of those deliberating. Given the tendency 
for deliberation to be interpreted as rational communication, I prefer 
using the term “communication” to emphasize that Spinoza did not rely 
on the rationality of any particular member of the group to yield an agree-
ment that could be considered rational.
For Spinoza, recovering from a state of fear required massive political 
participation. This participation was meant to create hope in each individual 
that his or her desires might be realized through participation. Hope, as 
we’ve seen, is an unstable emotion. However, in this circumstance, Spinoza 
proposed that hope merely brings participants to the democratic table. The 
process of democracy—communication, advising and creating new agree-
ments for the future of the state—creates new affective alignments for those 
participating. This process rebuilds citizens as it rebuilds the state or political 
community—ideally on firmer ground than hope alone.
E. TUCKER
 145
If one can see echoes of the Obama campaign’s attempt to build 
community through community service and volunteering, that’s no mis-
take. The idea of active democratic participation runs from Spinoza to Marx 
to the 2008 Obama campaign.97 This is not to say that Obama is a Marxist, 
but rather that they share the idea that building community capacity inocu-
lates populations against the corrosive effects of hate and fear. The failure of 
the Obama program of active democratic participation does not undermine 
the fact that such an approach is, according to Spinoza’s theory, the only 
way to effectively rebuild social trust, and thereby the power of a state.
This passage from the Political Treatise is particularly apt:
And what we have written will, perhaps, be received with derision by those 
who limit to the populace only the vices which are inherent in all mortals … 
as for the populace being devoid of truth and judgment, that is nothing 
wonderful, since the chief business of the dominion is transacted behind its 
back, and it can but make conjectures from the little, which cannot be hid-
den. For it is an uncommon virtue to suspend one’s judgment. So it is 
supreme folly to wish to transact everything behind the backs of the citizens, 
and to expect that they will not judge ill of the same, and will not give every-
thing an unfavorable interpretation. For if the populace could moderate 
itself, and suspend its judgment about things with which it is imperfectly 
acquainted, or judge rightly of things by the little it knows already, it would 
surely be more fit to govern, than to be governed. But, as we said, all have 
the same nature. All grow haughty with rule, and cause fear if they do not 
feel it, and everywhere truth is generally transgressed by enemies or guilty 
people; especially where one or a few have mastery, and have respect in trials 
not to justice or truth, but to amount of wealth.
The Political Treatise, as anyone who has read it will attest, is a fairly 
disappointing book. It was written after Spinoza had lost his youthful hope 
in the possibilities of his political present, and after he had witnessed turbu-
lent political events that had been unthinkable. The writer of the Political 
Treatise is a chastened political philosopher, who can no longer write about 
people and about democracy as he once did in the Theological- Political 
Treatise—a book that looks positively upbeat in its hopefulness about the 
naturalness and inevitability of democracy. However chastened, the writer 
of the Political Treatise is still a democrat. He still thinks that the only way 
to seek peace is to include as many people as possible. He argues in the pas-
sage above that those who would deride the populace should not—since 
human nature is everywhere the same, echoing his dictum from the TTP 
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that good citizens are not born, they are made.98 Thus, the ignorance, 
foolishness, and violence of the multitude is to be expected. They are igno-
rant of the workings of the state, because these workings are hidden from 
them—they take no active part in it, so they have no knowledge of how 
things work. What little they do know may be false, inflammatory or both. 
So, it is no wonder that they act badly. Blaming people for acting badly, 
when their actions could have been avoided is not just bad form, it’s shirk-
ing responsibility to engage and include the populace.
I take from this passage and Spinoza’s writings in general two clear mes-
sages: (1) If we seek truth, enlightenment, freedom or salvation, we must 
not deride those elements of human nature that seem to bar us from attain-
ing them—our emotions, our tendency to mistake consequence for cause or 
to believe other falsities, and our desires. Neither can we deride the emo-
tions of others—the hate, anger and fear that motivate their political choices 
needs to be understood. Instead of judging and bemoaning our collective 
fate, we must try to understand our emotions, desires, and ways of thinking 
and knowing as if they were ‘rocks and stones’—that is, fully intelligible and 
morally neutral objects of inquiry. This is true not just for our own emo-
tions, desires and minds, but also for those of the  ‘multitude’ or aggregation 
of other humans among whom we live. Rather than fearing or hating them, 
or deriding their judgment and passions, we must understand them. We 
must understand their emotions, their beliefs and their desires. These may 
be odious to us, they may seem ridiculous or just false, but if we do not 
understand them, we can never change their minds or improve their circum-
stances. (2) The second lesson I take from Spinoza is as follows: for our own 
sake, that is, for our own enlightenment, empowerment and freedom, we 
must do just that—improve the minds and circumstances of the multitude 
among which we live.99 Most importantly, the lesson from Spinoza seems to 
be that to empower the multitude requires that we create institutions that 
include them, that allow them to communicate their beliefs, emotions, 
desires and interests to as many others as possible.
Following Spinoza, our aims must be to improve and not perfect—
since this is impossible. Our aims must be to understand, and intervene 
carefully to build institutions that foster empowerment in regular, imper-
fect, passionate humans. These institutions will be communicative and 
participatory, and they must include as many as possible. The lesson of 
Spinoza’s life and work, for us, in the time of Trump is to retain our belief 
in democracy by working to make it stronger, more inclusive, and more 
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participatory. In order to avoid tyrants and fools for leaders, we need 
strong, educated, and healthy citizens. This, from a Spinozist point of 
view, is the work to be done in a time of anger, indignation and hate.
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